

Tab A
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE POST-HOSTILITIES PERIOD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following listing of requirements for the post-hostilities period in Southeast Asia is intentionally general and does not include the detailed sub-categorization of information needs that would fall under each of the general requirements.

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I. Near Term Requirements (Of Special Interest in the First Few Months After the End of Hostilities)

- A. Information regarding American hostages who might remain in Indochina and on the fate of US personnel not yet accounted for in the area.
- B. Information on emergent South Vietnamese or Cambodian anti-Communist guerrilla activity or remaining pockets of government resistance.
- C. Evidence of reprisals and atrocities in Vietnam and Cambodia, and in general, Communist treatment of government military and political prisoners.
- D. Information on food shortages and other economic problems in Vietnam and Cambodia relevant to questions about humanitarian aid.
- E. Disposition of captured US military equipment and technology.
- F. Information from abroad of efforts to subvert/black-mail refugees from Indochina now in the US.

II. Longer Term General Requirements

A. Indochina

- 1. Strength, disposition, and operations of Communist main force units in Indochina (down to division level or equivalent).

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- (a) Evidence of offensive military preparations or intent to move against other countries by any means.
2. State and party relations among North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, especially with reference to political-military situations such as:
 - (a) Development of mutual defense or aid arrangements.
 - (b) Major political and economic steps toward the reunification of North and South Vietnam.
 - (c) Developing factionalism among and within the Communist parties in Indochina.
 - (d) Character and make-up of the governments in Indochina.
3. State and party relations of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos with countries external to Indochina, especially with reference to:
 - (a) Foreign military and economic aid.
 - (b) Insurgent movements elsewhere.
 - (c) Sino-Soviet competition in the area.
 - (d) Foreign military presence in Indochina (e.g., PRC road building in Laos or potential USSR naval interest).
 - (e) The Indochina countries' roles in regional Southeast Asian affairs and positions on international issues, e.g., Law of the Sea, UN matters, etc.
 - (f) Attitudes toward the United States.
4. Internal problems and policies of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, especially as they relate to post-war reconstruction or development and population control.

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(a) Information on the governments' plans, priorities, and achievements in restoring agricultural and industrial output and steps to supply fertilizer, fuel, raw materials, capital equipment, and other inputs.

(b) Information on the problems impeding growth and development.

(c) Information on Vietnamese Communist policy toward development of oil resources.

5. Information on the Indochina countries' financial, trade, and investment policies and major activities, including evidence of violations of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and Foreign Asset Control Regulations.

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III. CHINA

- A. Information needs relating to major PRC concerns and activities in Southeast Asia will not change appreciably as a result of Communist take-over in Indochina. There will be a continuing need to monitor:
1. Chinese relations with the DRV, including levels of economic and military aid.
 2. Chinese relations with the government in Laos, including aid to Vientiane.
 3. Chinese troop strength in northern Laos.
 4. Chinese relations with the new government in Cambodia, including economic and military aid levels, as well as any indications that Peking is attempting to support to influence factions within the government in Phnom Penh.
 5. Chinese relations with the PRG (for so long as it exists), including aid levels and any indications that Peking is attempting to play off PRG leaders against Hanoi.
 6. Levels of Chinese aid to the insurgency in Thailand and Burma.
 7. Indications that Peking has begun to supply materiel aid to other insurgencies in Southeast Asia.
 8. Chinese state-to-state relations with other governments in Southeast Asia, including levels of economic assistance to these governments.
 9. Chinese military capabilities and deployments in the South China Sea area, particularly with respect to the Paracel and Spratly Islands.
- B. Recent developments in Southeast Asia are not likely either to have an appreciable impact on China's economy or to alter significantly the nature of our economic analysis. (Continue reporting information on economic problems, trends, and prospects as in the past.)

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